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Abstract
This study investigates how exporters respond to an exogenous shock, using the 2012
customer boycott of Japanese products in China that occurred after political conflict
over the islands in the East China Sea. By using Japanese firm-level data for 2011–
2013 and employing the difference-in-differences method, we conduct an assessment of
the boycott. We find that Japanese firms faced a large decrease in exports to China after
the 2012 boycott and that the decrease in exports was more pronounced for arm’s length
exports than intra-firm exports. In addition, the estimation results provide evidence that
Japanese firms exporting to China responded to the exogenous trade shock by reducing
their number of temporary workers. This finding suggests that trade shocks due to
international conflict hit the most insecure workers.
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1 Introduction
Many studies in the trade literature have demonstrated the extent to which international
trade is affected by external demand shocks. For example, the analysis of the effect of the
global financial crisis in 2008 on international trade showed how seriously the reduction in
world demand damaged international trade.1 In addition to these demand shocks, the recent
rise in political tension and conflict globally may bring about external shocks to global demand
and disturb the sound development of international trade. Indeed, many economists have
attempted to demonstrate the extent to which demand shocks due to political conflict affect
international trade, using country- and industry-level trade data.2
Turning to the firm level, it is natural to expect firms, reacting to demand shocks owing
to the fluctuation of international trade, to change their production and supply to match de-
mand. However, analyses of the impact of political tension and conflict on corporate behavior
have been limited to the best of the authors’ knowledge. In particular, there have been few
attempts to investigate the impact based on firm-level data compared with aggregated data.
To bridge this gap in the literature on this topic, this study examines the extent to which firms
react to demand shocks caused by political conflict, using Japanese manufacturing firm-level
data.
Consumer boycott against the products of a counterpart’s economy is one political conflict
that may negatively affect bilateral trade. Empirical studies have examined the impact of
consumer boycotts in the aftermath of the Iraq War of 2003 on the bilateral trade between
the United States and France (Chavis and Leslie, 2009; Michaels and Zhi, 2010; Davis and
Meunier, 2011). A comprehensive study of this topic is presented by Heilmann (2016), who
examines the impact of consumer boycotts on international trade by using various political
incidents such as the boycott of Danish products by Muslim countries after the Muhammad
comic crisis in 2005 and 2006, the boycott of Japanese products in China after the Senkaku
islands conflict in 2012, the boycott of Israeli products by Turkey over the Gaza conflict in
2014, and the boycott of French products in the United States over the Iraq War in 2003. By
using monthly product-level trade data, he shows that consumer boycotts depress bilateral
trade and that the negative effects are more pronounced in consumer goods than intermediate
goods.
Considering the domestic market and multilateral trade, firms respond to external de-
mand shocks in several ways. Exporting firms may adjust their supply destinations across
domestic and export markets to match production to lower foreign demand. Indeed, ex-
porting firms may respond to a shock by “substituting” output between their domestic and
export markets when they face demand shocks in a foreign market. Vannoorenberghe (2012)
provides evidence supporting this view, using French firm-level data for 1998 to 2007. By
1See Levchenko et al. (2010); Bricongne et al. (2012); Behrens et al. (2013)
2See Martin et al. (2008); Armstrong (2012)
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contrast, empirical results support that variations in domestic sales are positively correlated
with those in exports. For instance, Berman et al. (2015) show complementarity between
domestic and export sales when firms face exogenous shocks in foreign markets, based on
French firm-level data combined with destination-specific export data for 1995–2001. How-
ever, the way in which firms adjust their production and supply destinations to respond to
demand shocks remains an empirical question.
Firms may adjust not only their supply destination but also the size of production and
input factors. To clarify this issue, we evaluate the impact not only on output but also on
input factors. Few attempts have been made to adjust input factors when firms face foreign
demand shocks. When the effect of demand shocks on exporting is overwhelmingly large
and beyond the adjustment of the destination, firms may reduce their employment to adjust
their production. If firms reduce labor inputs, they may minimize the adjustment cost by
replacing the composition of permanent workers that have high firing costs and temporary
workers that have low firing costs.3 However, the degree to which the exporter’s production
and employment changes in response to unexpected demand shocks remains to be examined.
Our study thus empirically investigates the effect of demand shocks brought about by political
conflict in export markets on domestic production and employment at the firm level.
We focus on Japanese firms’ behavior after the Chinese consumer boycott of Japanese
products in 2012. Political conflict is considered to be an unexpected and exogenous shock
that enables us to identify the causal effect as a natural experiment. Although economic
relations between Japan and China have deepened over the past three decades, political
conflict has been exposed over the territorial rights of the islands in the East China Sea.
The most typical case of political tension that affects bilateral economic relations is that of
the consumer boycotts of Japanese products in China after Japan’s nationalization of the
Senkaku Islands in September 2012. To examine how firms respond to such a consumer
boycott, we employ the difference-in-differences (DID) technique. We construct a model for
the empirical estimation in which the treatment group comprises firms exporting to China,
which are more susceptible to the demand shock caused by the consumer boycott of Japanese
goods in China than firms that do not export to China.4
The main findings of this study are threefold. First, we find negative impacts of the
Chinese boycott on Japanese firms’ exports and employment. In particular, the intensive
margin, measured as the responses of exporting firms that continued to export to China after
the shock, is dominant in the decrease in exports and employment. Second, the DID estimates
indicate that Japanese firms reallocate their outputs to countries other than China but that
this action cannot offset the negative export shock in the Chinese market. Third, we find
3Matsuura et al. (2011) address the view that the increase in volatility forces firms to shift from permanent
to temporary workers to save labor adjustment costs.
4This idea is also used by Fisman et al. (2014), who examine the impact of negative shocks to the China–
Japan relationship on stock value and report that firms with high exposure in terms of sales are more likely
to lose stock value.
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that firms reduce the number of employees by adjusting the composition of permanent and
temporary workers after the demand shock. Specifically, firms that carry out arm’s length
exports to China decrease the number of temporary workers in response to the shock. These
results suggest that demand shocks in foreign markets transmit to the labor market in Japan.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Japanese firm-
level data and presents descriptive statistics on the changes in firms’ exports and employment
around the demand shock in China. Section 3 describes the empirical specification based on
the DID technique. Section 4 examines whether firms reallocate their output to countries
other than China to mitigate their negative export shocks. Section 5 presents the results from
the DID analysis of the consumer boycott against Japanese products as a natural experiment
for the effect of demand shocks on labor demand. Section 6 concludes the study.
2 Data and descriptive analysis
2.1 Data
The firm-level data used in this study are taken from a mandatory enterprise survey, the
Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities (the METI survey). The survey
is conducted by the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). The targets
of the METI survey are firms with more than 50 employees and more than 30 million yen
in capital. Firms are required to answer the previous financial year’s information. In most
cases, the 2013 survey contains the FY2012 information between April 2012 and March 2013.
In the case of employment, however, firms are required to answer the number of workers as
of March 2013. We simply call FY2012 as 2012 and refer to the data from the 2013 survey
as the data on 2012.
2.2 Exports
Before the regression analysis, this section shows the descriptive statistics. Table 1 presents
the number of firms by export status in 2011, showing that non-exporters represent 66% of
the 13,533 manufacturing firms. Firms that export to China but do not export to other
countries account for 4% of manufacturing firms, while firms that do not export to China
but export to other countries account for 11%. Firms that export to China as well as other
countries account for 19% of all manufacturing firms. Table 1 also shows that more than 3000
manufacturing firms export to China, representing 23% of the total number. These figures
indicate that exporting to China is prevalent in Japanese manufacturing and imply that any
shocks in trade with China would affect many Japanese manufacturing firms.
Arm’s length exports are more vulnerable to exogenous shocks and more volatile than
intra-firm exports.5 We therefore classify all firms into four types: (i) firms that conduct
5See Bernard et al. (2009).
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Table 1: Number of firms by export status (2011)
Export region Number Percentage
Non-exporter 8,987 66
China only 498 4
Non-China only 1,442 11
Both 2,606 19
Total 13,533 100
Note: Data are taken from the METI survey.
neither intra-firm exports to China nor arm’s length exports to China, (ii) firms that conduct
intra-firm exports to China but do not conduct arm’s length exports to China, (iii) firms that
conduct arm’s length exports to China but do not conduct intra-firm exports to China, and
(iv) firms that conduct both intra-firm and arm’s length exports to China. Table 2 presents
the number of firms of each type, showing that arm’s length exports are more prevalent than
intra-firm exports among Japanese manufacturing exporters to China. It further shows that
arm’s length exporters without intra-firm exports are the largest group of exporters to China.
Table 2: Number of firms by export status (2011): intra-firm versus arm’s length exports
Intra-firm exports to China
Arm’s length exports to China No Yes Total
No 10,460 659 11,119
Yes 1,579 866 2,445
Total 12,039 1,525 13,564
Note: Data are taken from the METI survey.
Table 3 presents the change in exports to China between 2001 and 2012. It shows the strik-
ing result that arm’s length exports decrease, while intra-firm exports increase during that
period. The largest decrease in arm’s length exports is observed among firms that conduct
arm’s length exports to China but do not conduct intra-firm exports (“Arm’s length only”).
Firms that conduct both arm’s length exports and intra-firm exports to China (“Both”)
experience the largest decrease in exports to China.
Table 4 decomposes the change in exports to China between 2001 and 2012 into the in-
tensive and extensive margins. It shows that the intensive margin (i.e., continuing exporters)
accounts for most of the change in exports to China during this period, in terms of the change
in both total exports and intra-firm and arm’s length exports.
2.3 Employment
Next, we explore the impacts of international conflict on domestic employment. The de-
scriptive analysis in the previous subsection suggests that arm’s length exports are more
vulnerable to political shocks and that the intensive margin accounts for most change in
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Table 3: Change in exports to China between 2011 and 2012 by export mode
No. of firms All Intra-firm Arm’s length
Export mode in 2011 (billion yen) (billion yen) (billion yen)
No exports 9519 244.4 142.7 101.7
Arm’s length only 1483 98.6 725.1 -626.5
Intra-firm only 601 -39.1 -77.3 38.2
Both 810 -459.4 -250.4 -209.0
Total 12413 -155.5 540.1 -695.6
Notes: Data are taken from the METI survey. “No exports” indicate firms that do not export to China.
“Arm’s length only” indicates firms that conduct arm’s length exports to China but do not conduct intra-firm
exports, while “Intra-firm only” indicates firms that conduct intra-firm exports to China but do not conduct
arm’s length exports. “Both” indicates firms that conduct both arm’s length exports and intra-firm exports
to China.
Table 4: Change in exports to China between 2011–2012: intensive versus extensive margins
No. of firms All Intra-firm Arm’s length
Exporter type (billion yen) (billion yen) (billion yen)
Intensive margin
Cont. increase 1131 1065.8 836.6 229.2
Cont. decrease 1403 -1313.5 -383.2 -930.3
Cont. unchanged 82 0.0 0.6 -0.6
Extensive margin
Stop 278 -152.2 -56.7 -95.5
Start 388 244.4 142.7 101.7
No exports 9131 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total 12413 -155.5 540.1 -695.6
Notes: Data are taken from the METI survey. “Cont. increase,” “Cont. decrease,” and “Cont. unchanged”
indicate continuing exporters that increase, decrease, and keep their exports to China between 2011 and 2012.
“Stop” indicates firms that stop exporting to China between 2011 and 2012, while “Start” indicates firms that
start exporting to China. “No exports” indicate firms that do not export to China during 2011–2012.
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exports to China. In this subsection, we provide a descriptive analysis of the employment
change between 2011 and 2012 to examine how firms respond to export shocks.
Table 5 presents the changes in the number of workers between 2011 and 2012. It shows
that among exporters to China, continuing exporters that decrease their exports (“Cont.
decrease”) account for the largest decrease in the number of workers and that they, on
average, face the largest decrease in the number of workers. This finding corresponds to the
fact that the intensive margin accounts for most of the change in exports to China and offers
indirect evidence of the negative impact of export shocks due to international conflict on
employment.
This table also shows that firms tend to reduce the number of temporary workers rather
than that of permanent workers after a shock. The number of temporary workers decreases
between 2001 and 2012, while the number of permanent workers increases. This striking
result indicates that temporary workers are used as a buffer against an exogenous shock.
Table 5: Change in the number of workers between 2011 and 2012 by exporter type
Sum Average
Exporter type No. of firms ALL PERM TEMP ALL PERM TEMP
Cont. increase 1,131 1,904 5,629 -3,725 1.7 5.0 -3.3
Cont. decrease 1,403 -15,947 3,342 -19,289 -11.4 2.4 -13.7
Cont. unchanged 82 -345 -396 51 -4.2 -4.8 0.6
Stop 278 -1,231 -1,168 -63 -4.4 -4.2 -0.2
Start 388 5,654 3,935 1,719 14.6 10.1 4.4
No exports to China 9,131 -12,959 6,173 -19,132 -1.4 0.7 -2.1
Total 12,413 -22,924 17,515 -40,439 -1.8 1.4 -3.3
Notes: Data are taken from the METI survey. “ALL” indicates all workers in Japan, while “PERM” and
“TEMP” indicate permanent and temporary workers in Japan, respectively. “Cont. increase,” “Cont. de-
crease,” and “Cont. unchanged” indicate continuing exporters that increase, decrease, and keep their exports
to China between 2011 and 2012. “Stop” indicates firms that stop exporting to China between 2011 and 2012,
while “Start” indicates firms that start exporting to China. “No exports” indicate firms that do not export
to China during 2011–2012.
Figure 1 confirms the previous results that temporary workers are used as a buffer to
shocks. It shows that firms that export to China in 2011 increase their number of permanent
workers but decrease their number of temporary workers more than firms that do not export
to China in 2011 do.
Table 6 presents the employment change after the shock by export mode. Firms that
conduct both arm’s length and intra-firm exports to China (“Both”) account for the largest
decrease in the number of temporary workers, while they increase the total and average
number of permanent workers. In addition, their average reduction of temporary workers is
by far the largest. These results suggest that they adjust their worker composition by raising
their share of permanent workers.
Firms that conduct arm’s length exports to China but do not conduct intra-firm exports
(“Arm’s length only”) and firms that conduct intra-firm exports to China but do not conduct
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Figure 1: Change in the number of workers: exporters versus non-exporters
Notes: Data are taken from the METI survey. 2011 = 100.
arm’s length exports (“Intra-firm only”) decrease the total and average number of both
permanent and temporary workers.
Table 6: Change in the number of workers between 2011 and 2012 by export mode in 2011
Sum Average
Export mode in 2011 No. of firms ALL PERM TEMP ALL PERM TEMP
Arm’s length only 1,483 -7,359 -4,041 -3,318 -5.0 -2.7 -2.2
Intra-firm only 601 -4,005 -2,442 -1,563 -6.7 -4.1 -2.6
Both 810 -4,255 13,890 -18,145 -5.3 17.1 -22.4
No exports to China 9,519 -7,305 10,108 -17,413 -0.8 1.1 -1.8
Total 12,413 -22,924 17,515 -40,439 -1.8 1.4 -3.3
Notes: Data are taken from the METI survey. “ALL” indicates all workers in Japan, while “PERM” and
“TEMP” indicate permanent and temporary workers in Japan, respectively. “No exports” indicate firms that
do not export to China. “Arm’s length only” indicates firms that conduct arm’s length exports to China
but do not conduct intra-firm exports, while “Intra-firm only” indicates firms that conduct intra-firm exports
to China but do not conduct arm’s length exports. “Both” indicates firms that conduct both arm’s length
exports and intra-firm exports to China.
3 Empirical specification
To examine the impacts of the export shock after the nationalization of the islands on
Japanese firms’ employment, we employ a standard DID estimator. In our case, treated
firms are those that export to China in 2011, while control firms are those that do not. In
the main estimation, we exclude non-exporters from the estimation sample but include them
in the sample as a robustness check in Section 5.4. Our DID variables are an interaction
term between the dummy for treated firms and a dummy for the year 2012, DID2012, and
an interaction term between the dummy for treated firms and a dummy for the year 2013,
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DID2013. We focus on the number of workers (L), number of permanent workers (PERM),
and number of temporary workers (TEMP )6, as our outcome variables (O).
Following the standard framework of Hamermesh (1993), we derive the labor demand
equations from the production function. We consider a firm using three factors of production:
permanent workers, temporary workers, and capital (K). The production function is
Y = f(PERM,TEMP,K) (1)
where we omit the firm and time subscripts for brevity. We assume that the first-order
derivatives of the production function are positive, while the second-order derivatives are
negative. The associated cost function is
C = g(WAGE,WAGETEMP , r, Y ) (2)
where WAGE and WAGETEMP are the wages for permanent workers and temporary work-
ers, respectively, while r is the price of capital services. We assume that the first-order
derivatives of the cost function are positive. By using Shephard’s lemma, we can derive the
following labor demand equations:
PERM = XPERM (WAGE,WAGETEMP , r, Y ) and (3)
TEMP = XTEMP (WAGE,WAGETEMP , r, Y ). (4)
For the estimation, we employ the following log-linear form with the DID dummies:
lnOit = β0 + β1DID2012it + β2DID2013it + β3 lnWAGEit (5)
+β4 lnV Ait + β5 lnRit + β6Y EARt + β7INDUSTRYit
+β8Y EAR ∗ INDUSTRYit + it
where the subscripts i and t index firm and year. O is our outcome variable. We employ
the number of temporary workers, TEMP , number of permanent workers, PERM , and
total number of workers, L. Permanent workers’ hourly wages, WAGE, value added, V A,
and rental of capital services,7 R, are included. Y EAR and INDUSTRY are the year and
industry dummies, respectively. Their interaction terms are included to control for the wages
for temporary workers since temporary workers’ wages, WAGETEMP , are unavailable and
assumed to exhibit no exogenous variation across industries.
6Temporary workers are called “non-standard workers” in Japan. The number of temporary workers is the
sum of the number of part-time workers, dispatched workers, and day laborers in our data.
7Based on Hall and Jorgenson (1967), the rental of capital services is calculated as R = q(d + i), where q
is the price of new investment goods, d the rate of depreciation, and i the interest rate. All variables are at
the firm level.
9
4 Substitutability between markets
Before assessing the impacts of the boycotts in China on Japanese firms’ employment, this
section analyzes the impacts on Japanese firms’ exports to examine whether firms reallocate
their output to countries other than China. Firms can reallocate their output to other markets
if they face negative exogenous shocks in a particular market (Berman et al. 2015; Hiller et al.
2014). By so doing, they can mitigate the impact of the shocks on domestic employment.
In our case, Japanese firms that face negative export shocks in China can reallocate their
output to countries other than China. To examine whether firms reallocate their output to
countries other than China, we employ the following equation:
lnXit = γ0 + γ1DID2012it + γ2DID2013it + γ3 lnTFPit (6)
+γ4 lnCIit + γ5MNECHN,it + γ6MNENONCHN,it + γ7FORit
+γ8Y EARt + γ9INDUSTRYit + γ10Y EAR ∗ INDUSTRYit + it
where Xit is either domestic sales (lnDOMESTIC SALES) or exports to countries other
than China (lnEX NONCHN). Exports to countries other than China are further divided
into intra-firm exports (lnEX NONCHN AL) and arm’s length exports (lnEX NONCHN AL).
We also investigate the impacts on total exports (lnEXPORT ), using it as an additional
dependent variable. lnTFP is total factor productivity, lnCI is capital intensity (capital
over valued added), MNECHN is a dummy for multinational enterprises (MNEs) that have
a foreign subsidiary in China, MNENONCHN is a dummy for MNEs that have a foreign
subsidiary outside China, and FOR is a dummy for foreign-owned firms.
Table 7 presents the estimation results of Equation (6). Column (1) reports the results
using domestic sales as the dependent variable, while column (2) reports the results using
exports to countries other than China as the dependent variable. The DID dummies are
insignificant in column (1) but significantly positive in column (2). The significantly posi-
tive coefficients of the DID dummy on the log of exports to countries other than China in
column (2) indicate that firms reallocate their output to other markets. This result suggests
that there is substitutability between exports to China and sales in other foreign markets.
The insignificant coefficients of the DID dummies in column (1) suggest that there is no
substitutability between exports to China and domestic sales.
Columns (3) and (4) present the contrasting results that there are positive impacts on
arm’s length exports to countries other than China but no impacts on intra-firm exports.
This finding shows that firms reallocate their output by increasing arm’s length exports
rather than intra-firm exports to countries other than China. Finally, in column (5), the DID
dummies are negatively significant, implying that total exports have negative impacts on the
boycott in China. This finding suggests that negative export shocks in China are not fully
offset by increasing exports to other countries.
10
To summarize, the results suggest that Japanese firms that face negative export shocks
partly reallocate their output to other countries. Such a reallocation can mitigate the negative
impacts on domestic employment but it does not fully offset the negative shock on exports
to China.
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5 Results
5.1 Impacts on employment: DID
This section presents the DID estimation results to discuss the impacts of the export shock due
to the nationalization of the islands.8 Table 8 shows the estimation results of Equation (5).
Columns (1)–(3) report the baseline results, while columns (4)–(6) report the results when
using arm’s length exporters to China as the treated firms. In columns (4)–(6), firms that
conduct intra-firm exports to China but do not conduct arm’s length exports are excluded
from the estimation sample. Columns (4)–(6) reflect the severe impact of the shock more
than columns (1)–(3) since the descriptive analysis in the previous section suggests that arm’s
length exports are more vulnerable to exogenous shocks.
Columns (1) and (4) show the significantly negative impacts on domestic employment in
Japan one year after the nationalization since the DID dummies, DID2013, are significantly
negative. In columns (2) and (3) as well as (5) and (6), the coefficient of the DID dummies are
negative but insignificant. In addition, against our prediction, we do not find any difference
between arm’s length exporters and other exporters in Table 8.
The coefficients of the other explanatory variables have the theoretically predicted signs.
Permanent workers’ wages are negatively significant in columns (1), (2), (4), and (5) and are
insignificant in columns (3) and (6), implying that employing temporary workers is insensitive
to permanent workers’ wages. This finding suggests that temporary workers’ role is different
from that of permanent workers in Japanese firms. The positively significant coefficients
of value added in all columns simply indicate that firms with higher growth employ more
workers. The coefficients of the rental of capital services are positively significant in all
columns. This result reflects the substitutability between capital and labor, as described in
standard production theory.
5.2 Impacts on employment: Continuous DID
It is naturally predicted that the impact of the shock depends on the extent to which
firms depend on China. This subsection presents the continuous DID estimation results,
using export exposure to China instead of the dichotomous exporter dummy. Export ex-
posure to China is defined as the share of exports to China in total sales in 2011. By
using this variable, we construct the continuous DID variables SALESSH CHN2012 and
SALESSH CHN2013. SALESSH CHN2012 is an interaction term between export expo-
sure to China and a dummy for the year 2012 and SALESSH CHN2013 is an interaction
8We also examine whether the impacts on employment differ by firm size, using the quantile regression
technique. The results reveal no systematic difference in impacts on temporary workers by firm size since
the negative impacts are universally significant in all quantiles. They also reveal that smaller firms receive
significantly negative impacts on permanent workers, while largest firms receive no impacts on permanent
workers.
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Table 8: Impacts on Japanese manufacturers’ employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treated: Exporters to China Arm’s length exporters to China
lnL lnPERM lnTEMP lnL lnPERM lnTEMP
DID2012 -0.006 -0.005 -0.014 -0.007 -0.005 -0.019
[0.004] [0.005] [0.030] [0.005] [0.005] [0.031]
DID2013 -0.012*** -0.006 -0.045 -0.013*** -0.006 -0.051
[0.004] [0.005] [0.030] [0.005] [0.005] [0.032]
lnWAGE -0.183*** -0.206*** -0.035 -0.191*** -0.212*** -0.069
[0.006] [0.006] [0.040] [0.007] [0.007] [0.045]
lnVA 0.159*** 0.158*** 0.164*** 0.159*** 0.155*** 0.185***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.034] [0.005] [0.006] [0.037]
lnR 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.027*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.031***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.008] [0.001] [0.001] [0.009]
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEAR*INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 11092 11092 11092 9588 9588 9588
R-squared 0.185 0.186 0.019 0.193 0.187 0.021
Notes: Firm fixed effects models are estimated. Standard errors are given in square brackets. Constants are
suppressed. The control group are exporters that do not export to China in 2011. In columns (4)–(6), firms
that conduct intra-firm exports to China but do not conduct arm’s length exports to China are excluded from
the estimation sample.
*** Indicates significance at the 1% level.
** Indicates significance at the 5% level.
* Indicates significance at the 10% level.
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term between export exposure to China and a dummy for the year 2013.
Table 9 presents the continuous DID estimation results. The coefficients of export expo-
sure to China are significantly negative in all columns, implying that firms with a higher share
of exports to China experience a larger reduction in their domestic employment one year after
the nationalization, regardless of whether they employ permanent and/or temporary workers.
Table 9: Impacts on Japanese manufacturers’ employment: Chinese export share
(1) (2) (3)
lnL lnPERM lnTEMP
SALESSH CHN2012 -0.017 -0.015 -0.063
[0.025] [0.026] [0.172]
SALESSH CHN2013 -0.065** -0.051* -0.308*
[0.026] [0.027] [0.174]
lnWAGE -0.183*** -0.206*** -0.037
[0.006] [0.006] [0.040]
lnVA 0.159*** 0.159*** 0.158***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.034]
lnR 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.028***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.008]
YEAR YES YES YES
INDUSTRY YES YES YES
YEAR*INDUSTRY YES YES YES
Observations 11092 11092 11092
R-squared 0.179 0.180 0.011
Notes: Firm fixed effects models are estimated. Standard errors are given in square brackets. Constants are
suppressed. The control group are exporters that do not export to China in 2011.
*** Indicates significance at the 1% level.
** Indicates significance at the 5% level.
* Indicates significance at the 10% level.
5.3 Impacts on employment: non-MNEs
To eliminate any effects through the activity of foreign affiliates, we run a regression that
excludes MNEs. Table 10 reports the results of the standard DID and continuous DID
estimations. Columns (2), (3), (5), and (6) show that temporary workers receive negative
impacts, while permanent workers receive no impact. This finding implies that firms adjust
their worker composition by reducing their number of temporary workers. Column (6) further
shows that a significantly negative impact on the number of temporary workers appears in
the year of the nationalization. In addition, column (1) shows that reducing the number of
temporary workers results in significantly negative impacts on the total number of workers.
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Table 10: Impacts on Japanese manufacturers’ employment: Non-MNEs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DID Continuous DID
lnL lnPERM lnTEMP lnL lnPERM lnTEMP
DID2012 -0.008 0.001 -0.114*** -0.041 0.007 -0.849***
(SALESSH CHN2012) [0.006] [0.006] [0.041] [0.040] [0.042] [0.291]
DID2013 -0.010* 0.006 -0.143*** -0.067 0.033 -1.071***
(SALESSH CHN2013) [0.006] [0.006] [0.042] [0.042] [0.044] [0.307]
lnWAGE -0.139*** -0.155*** 0.009 -0.138*** -0.155*** 0.013
[0.008] [0.009] [0.062] [0.008] [0.009] [0.061]
lnVA 0.144*** 0.134*** 0.165*** 0.142*** 0.135*** 0.149***
[0.007] [0.008] [0.054] [0.007] [0.008] [0.054]
lnR 0.003** 0.003* 0.008 0.004** 0.004** 0.010
[0.002] [0.002] [0.012] [0.002] [0.002] [0.012]
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEAR*INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 4555 4555 4555 4555 4555 4555
R-squared 0.169 0.158 0.036 0.157 0.143 0.017
Notes: Firm fixed effects models are estimated. Standard errors are given in square brackets. Constants are suppressed.
In columns (4)–(6), SALESSH CHN are used instead of the DID dummy. The control group are exporters that do
not export to China in 2011. MNEs are excluded from the estimation sample.
*** Indicates significance at the 1% level.
** Indicates significance at the 5% level.
* Indicates significance at the 10% level.
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5.4 Impacts on employment: All firms
In the above estimation, we exclude non-exporters from the estimation sample. In this
subsection, we include non-exporters in the estimation sample and confirm the main results.
Table 11 shows that significantly negative impacts on the number of workers are prevalent
regardless of worker type one year after the nationalization. Columns (4)–(6) indicate that
higher export exposure to China results in a larger reduction in the number of both temporary
and permanent workers.
Table 11: Impacts on Japanese manufacturers’ employment: All firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DID Continuous DID
lnL lnPERM lnTEMP lnL lnPERM lnTEMP
DID2012 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.029 -0.018 -0.095
(SALESSH CHN2012) [0.003] [0.003] [0.019] [0.023] [0.027] [0.155]
DID2013 -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.041** -0.091*** -0.075*** -0.377**
(SALESSH CHN2013) [0.003] [0.003] [0.019] [0.023] [0.027] [0.156]
lnWAGE -0.140*** -0.207*** 0.069*** -0.141*** -0.207*** 0.065***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.020] [0.003] [0.004] [0.020]
lnVA 0.152*** 0.177*** 0.114*** 0.152*** 0.177*** 0.114***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.020] [0.003] [0.004] [0.020]
lnR 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.013*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.014***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.005] [0.001] [0.001] [0.005]
YEAR YES YES YES YES YES YES
INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES
YEAR*INDUSTRY YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 30623 30623 30623 30623 30623 30623
R-squared 0.148 0.170 0.013 0.143 0.167 0.009
Notes: Firm fixed effects models are estimated. Standard errors are given in square brackets. Constants are suppressed.
In columns (4)–(6), SALESSH CHN are used instead of the DID dummy. The control group are firms that do not
export to China in 2011.
*** Indicates significance at the 1% level.
** Indicates significance at the 5% level.
* Indicates significance at the 10% level.
6 Conclusion
This study analyzes the impact of demand shocks caused by political conflict on employment
by using Japanese firm-level data. The political incident that occurred between Japan and
China in 2012 moved to an economic issue in the form of a boycott of Japanese products in
China. We use this exogenous incident as a natural experiment to identify the causal effect.
In contrast to previous studies of this topic that have focused on the impact on bilateral
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trade, we conduct a richer observation that incorporates impacts on domestic production
and labor demand. We identify the impact by using the DID technique, assuming that firms
that export to China are more likely to be exposed by China’s consumer boycott.
Based on Japanese manufacturing firm-level data, we find that the exogenous trade shock
due to the consumer boycott of Japanese products in China affects the domestic market.
The demand shock decreases the labor demand of manufacturing firms in Japan by 1.2%,
and this negative impact is concentrated in firms that conduct arm’s length exports to China.
Specifically, those firms reduce labor demand for temporary workers rather than permanent
workers, suggesting that firms respond to the demand shock by reducing their number of
temporary workers. This result is most likely to reflect the lower firing costs of temporary
workers compared with those of permanent workers. Our empirical results imply that the
burden incurred by bilateral political conflict and the resulting consumer boycott is leading
to workers having less stable job security in the labor market.
Although we observe a labor adjustment (i.e., reducing the number of temporary workers)
in response to the demand shock, it may be necessary to qualify this result considering the
rigidity of the labor market. In Japan, the dismissal of permanent workers is strictly regulated
by labor law, which results in high firing costs for permanent workers. This background may
urge firms to adjust their employment of temporary workers. Finally, we note that there is
an empirical challenge in the estimation of the labor demand equations. In our empirical
strategy, we obtained results by using the standard DID estimation technique to identify the
impacts of the consumer boycott on the domestic labor market. However, covariates such
as wages and value added are also likely to be affected by the demand shock. Dealing with
the potential endogeneity problems in the labor demand equation therefore remains to be
addressed in a future study.
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Appendix
Table 12: Japanese manufacturing firms’ exports to China (2011)
Industry name No. of firms All Intra-firm Arm’s length
(billion yen) (%) (%)
Food products and beverages 1747 17.9 19.6 80.4
Textiles 233 33.9 50.2 49.8
Clothing 275 16.7 67.9 32.1
Wood and wood products 140 0.8 0.3 99.7
Furniture 129 1.4 61.8 38.2
Paper and paper products 407 11.8 58.7 41.3
Publishing, printing 822 34.6 10.5 89.5
Leather 25 0.5 25.2 74.8
Rubber products 151 43.3 55.3 44.7
Chemicals and chemical products 931 758.1 27.0 73.0
Coke, refined petroleum, and plastics products 852 421.0 15.8 84.2
Other non-metallic mineral products 441 82.5 49.2 50.8
Basic iron and steel 446 388.8 8.6 91.4
Non-ferrous metals 376 312.5 28.0 72.0
Fabricated metal products 1068 54.0 27.9 72.1
Machinery and equipment 1681 1245.0 39.6 60.4
Electrical machinery and apparatus 1837 2232.4 35.6 64.4
Motor vehicles 1270 2117.9 58.6 41.4
Precision instruments 344 153.7 69.9 30.1
Other manu. 389 135.0 47.6 52.4
Total 13564 8061.7 39.9 60.1
Note: Data are taken from the METI survey.
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Table 13: Change in Japanese manufacturing firms’ exports to China (2011–2012)
Industry name No. of firms All Intra-firm Arm’s length
(billion yen) (billion yen) (billion yen)
Food products and beverages 1575 2.0 -0.6 2.6
Textiles 216 -5.2 -5.2 0.1
Clothing 252 -2.7 -2.0 -0.7
Wood and wood products 130 0.1 0.0 0.1
Furniture 113 1.3 0.1 1.2
Paper and paper products 369 1.3 -2.2 3.6
Publishing, printing 736 -9.8 1.1 -10.9
Leather 21 0.0 0.0 0.0
Rubber products 138 -7.2 -2.4 -4.9
Chemicals and chemical products 876 -36.9 23.8 -60.7
Coke, refined petroleum, and plastics products 790 4.1 7.2 -3.1
Other non-metallic mineral products 413 0.6 -0.5 1.1
Basic iron and steel 421 -62.8 34.3 -97.1
Non-ferrous metals 348 -45.0 -26.0 -19.1
Fabricated metal products 982 -9.2 0.6 -9.8
Machinery and equipment 1559 -179.5 -127.2 -52.3
Electrical machinery and apparatus 1641 549.5 746.9 -197.4
Motor vehicles 1182 -369.2 -113.9 -255.3
Precision instruments 312 19.7 6.6 13.1
Other manu. 339 -6.5 -0.5 -6.0
Total 12413 -155.5 540.1 -695.6
Note: Data are taken from the METI survey.
Table 14: China’s share in Japanese manufacturing firms (2011)
Industry name 2011 2012
Exports Sales Exports Sales
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Food products and beverages 14.0 0.1 14.1 0.1
Textiles 38.3 1.9 29.6 1.6
Clothing 61.7 1.8 60.4 1.5
Wood and wood products 17.1 0.1 9.6 0.1
Furniture 10.8 0.1 24.8 0.3
Paper and paper products 19.3 0.2 19.9 0.3
Publishing, printing 16.5 0.4 13.1 0.3
Leather 66.2 0.9 7.4 0.1
Rubber products 5.6 1.6 4.6 1.3
Chemicals and chemical products 21.7 2.4 20.7 2.3
Coke, refined petroleum, and plastics products 27.9 1.8 30.5 1.8
Other non-metallic mineral products 16.8 2.0 18.1 1.9
Basic iron and steel 12.7 2.6 15 2.4
Non-ferrous metals 24.4 3.1 21.6 2.9
Fabricated metal products 24.9 0.7 22.3 0.6
Machinery and equipment 16.9 5.0 14 3.9
Electrical machinery and apparatus 19.3 4.5 22.4 6
Motor vehicles 11.6 3.7 9.2 2.9
Precision instruments 10.2 3.3 9.3 3
Other manu. 22.6 3.2 21.6 2.8
Total 22.9 2.0 19.4 1.8
Note: Data are taken from the METI survey.
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